In Wisdom's Apprentice, twelve distinguished scholars pay grateful homage to their friend and mentor in recognition of his extraordinary contributions to the study of the philosophia perennis.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:ST. THOMAS'S FOURTH WAY AND CREATION LAWRENCE DEWAN, 0.P Dominican College ofPhilosophy and Theology Ottawa, Ontario, Canada EXPLAINING that what he means by "creating" is "causing things ex nihilo," Jacques Maritain, the renowned twentieth-century interpreter of Thomas Aquinas, says:... it is clear that this very fact, that things are created, is only known by us once we know that the First Cause exists; consequently, we cannot make (...) use of it in order to demonstrate the existence of that First Cause. All we know from the outset is that things are caused.1 This remark is made concerning all five ways. At the same time, Maritain presents the five not only as "typically distinct" from each other, but as... distributed in a certain order in which the depth of thought and the complexity of the discussion increase. In proportion as the mind delves deeper into the world of experience in order to reach the first starting point of its thinking, it discerns in the First Being more and more meaningful aspects, and richer perspectives are disclosed to it.2 Now, I agree entirely as to the depth of the starting-points and the progressively richer perspectives,' but I disagree with Maritain as to the role of the creature's createdness in leading to the knowledge of God in the Fourth Way. How is it "clear" that the createdness of things is only known once we know that a first cause exists? How, in general, does the createdness of things 1 Maritain, Jacques, Approaches to God, tr. Peter O'Reilly (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 64; see Approches de Dieu (Paris: Alsatia, 1953), 79.-ln this paper, "ST'' and "SCG" stand for Thomas Aquinas's Summa theologiae and Summa contra gentiles. 2 Maritain, Approaches, 63; Approches, 76-77. 3 See my paper, "The Number and Order of St. Thomas's FIVE WAYS", Downside Review 92 (1974): 1-18 371 372 LAWRENCE DEWAN, O.P. come to light, and why should it not come to light in things and so lead to the knowledge of the existence of the proper cause of such an effect? Indeed, can one really arrive at a knowledge of the existence of a "First Being" without having seen, by priority, the createdness of being? Let us recall the general plan for a way to God, as presented in the Summa theologiae. We are to reason from the existence of an effect, better known to us than its proper cause, to the existence of that proper cause.4 What is the effect, seen as an effect, in the Fourth Way, and to what "proper" cause does it lead us? The Fourth Way leads to a maximal being, which is cause of being for ALL beings. The universality of this effect is to be noted. The cause in question is viewed as the cause of a universal effect. Thomas does not content himself with saying that there is a first being which is the cause of being for all other beings. That, I would say, would not be wrong, but it would be mild and apt to mislead. Rather, he "goes out of his way," one might say, to establish that the cause of which he is speaking is such as to dominate an entire field in what I would call a "formal " way. After reasoning to the actual existence of the maximal being, by what is clearly an efficient/exemplar causal route,S he adds that such a maximal item is the cause of all things which belong to the same order. He then comes to God, named precisely as he wished to arrive at God in this Fourth Way, viz. as "cause of being for all beings." The importance of the incorporation of this point about the universality of the effect can be better apprec\ated if one looks back at the Summa contra gentiles. The SCG 1.13 argument which corresponds to the Fourth Way does not mention the point about universality at all. It uses Aristotle's Metaph. 2 only to 4 ST 1.2.2: "From any effect one can demonstrate the existence of its proper cause, if, of course, its effects... (shrink)

Uno de los temas más debatidos en el período inmediatamente posterior a la muerte de Tomás de Aquino fue cómo interpretar fielmente de acuerdo a sus textos el concepto de esse, dada la cualidad metafísica particular que éste adquiría en esta nueva ontología. Teniendo en cuenta que durante la escolástica los pensadores trataban de servirse de la filosofía como instrumento para explicar la fe, la comprensión del esse como distinto realmente de la esencia, fue el centro del debate por ser (...) la base del principal argumento para mostrar la diferencia ontológica entre Dios y las criaturas. (shrink)

Aquinas’ so-called “Intellectus essentiae Argument” for the distinction between being and essence is notoriously suspect, including among defenders of Aquinas’ distinction. For the paper in this volume, I take as my starting point the recent defense of the argument by Fr. Lawrence Dewan, O.P. Fr. Dewan’s project is unsuccessful. Pointing out some shortcomings in his readings allows me to take up his call to highlight the “formal” or “quidditative side” of Aquinas’ metaphysics, in this case in regards (...) to the proofs of the “real distinction.” Accordingly, the second half of this paper sets forth a way in which the famous “Intellectus essentiae Argument” of De Ente et Essentia 4 can succeed as a proof of the real distinction. Aquinas’ argument presupposes the prior real distinction between essence and supposit or individual substance. Esse is the ontological component that makes true our judgments that substances actually are: Obama exists. By contrast, this “truth-maker” cannot be predicated of humanity, although it is in Obama as really distinct from him. If Aquinas’ reasoning in this most contentious of his proofs can be saved, so, perhaps, can most of his other proofs. (shrink)

Cayetano tuvo un papel protagónico en los debates intelectuales de su época (s. XVI), destacándose como un auténtico adalid del tomismo; inclusive muchas de sus tesis pasaron a formar parte de tal doctrina, las cuales –a veces matizadas y otras no tanto– perviven hasta nuestros días. Entre los diversos temas que afrontó se destaca su particular noción de primum cognitum. Aquí, partimos del hecho de que la tradición tomista no ha visto mayores inconvenientes en equiparar lo que entienden Cayetano y (...) el Aquinate por el ens primo cadit; empero nosotros estamos en condiciones de afirmar que tal equiparación al menos es problemática. En este sentido, nos ocuparemos de realizar un primer acercamiento al tema del ente primer conocido cayetaniano para intentar mostrar su real significado. Asimismo, procuraremos ver, ayudados por los aportes de algunos estudiosos contemporáneos –en especial el de Lawrence Dewan–, hasta qué punto tal noción se corresponde o no con los desarrollos teóricos de Tomás de Aquino, sobre todo con el vínculo entre el primer conocido y el ente como objeto de la metafísica. (shrink)

The focus of this book is morals--how human beings should live their lives. For Dewan "morals" is "the journey of the rational creature toward God." While philosophical considerations are central here, Christian revelation and its truth constitute an enveloping context. These essays treat the history of philosophy as a development that proceeds by deepening appreciation of basic questions rather than the constant replacement of one worldview by another. Thus, the author finds forebears in Plato and Aristotle, in Augustine and (...) Boethius, and especially in Aquinas. Written over a period of more than thirty years, the essays collected here treat both perennial issues in philosophy and such current questions as suicide as a weapon of war, the death penalty, and lying. Above all, they present the wisdom, the sapiential vision, that makes morals possible. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas based on things "management" for the existence of God made ​​two different arguments, one found in the philosophy of Guinness, the other found in the Summa Theologica, which is the so-called "fifth way." First, the metaphysics, the fifth way is considered more important, so it is selected into the Summa Theologica. Secondly, I deal with this issue of the validity of the argument, stressing that this argument is based on absolute basis of experience. Thomas Aquinas presents two different (...) argument for the existence of a God based on the "government" of things, one in the Summer contra Gentiles and one in the Summa Theologiae, the latter the so-called "Fifth way". First, I argue that the Fifth way is metaphysically more fundmental, for which reason it is selected for use in the later Summa. Secondly, I address the question of the argument's validity, alling attention to its foundation in absolutely fundamental experience. (shrink)